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Abstract
Devolution changes the locus of power within a country from central to sub-national levels. In
2013, Kenya devolved health and other services from central government to 47 new sub-
national governments (known as counties). This transition seeks to strengthen democracy and
accountability, increase community participation, improve efficiency and reduce inequities.
With changing responsibilities and power following devolution reforms, comes the need for
priority-setting at the new county level. Priority-setting arises as a consequence of the needs
and demand for healthcare resources exceeding the resources available, resulting in the need
for some means of choosing between competing demands. We sought to explore the impact of
devolution on priority-setting for health equity and community health services. We conducted
key informant and in-depth interviews with health policymakers, health providers and politi-
cians from 10 counties (n¼269 individuals) and 14 focus group discussions with community
members based in 2 counties (n¼ 146 individuals). Qualitative data were analysed using the
framework approach. We found Kenya’s devolution reforms were driven by the need to demon-
strate responsiveness to county contexts, with positive ramifications for health equity in
previously neglected counties. The rapidity of the process, however, combined with limited
technical capacity and guidance has meant that decision-making and prioritization have been
captured and distorted for political and power interests. Less visible community health services
that focus on health promotion, disease prevention and referral have been neglected within the
prioritization process in favour of more tangible curative health services. The rapid transition in
power carries a degree of risk of not meeting stated objectives. As Kenya moves forward,
decision-makers need to address the community health gap and lay down institutional struc-
tures, processes and norms which promote health equity for all Kenyans.
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Introduction
Devolution reforms
Devolution reforms are political by nature, leading to changing power
and influence between actors, following the transfer of administrative,
political and fiscal responsibilities from central to sub-national locally
elected governments (Bossert and Beauvais 2002). A form of decen-
tralization, devolution should transfer power and decision-making
from central stakeholders to sub-national levels through shifting rela-
tionships, bringing decision-making closer to the population.
Devolution has the potential to allow users to shape service provision,
to increase responsiveness and faster implementation by avoiding cen-
tral bureaucracy, to improve quality, transparency and accountability
through community oversight and involvement in decision-making,
and to reduce existing inequities through distribution to traditionally
marginalized groups (Bossert and Beauvais 2002; Bossert 1998;
Cheema and Rondinelli 2007; Mitchell and Bossert 2010), (Faguet
and Po¨schl 2014). Past experiences with devolution however have
demonstrated the complexity of the process in practice, that outcomes
can be unpredictable and that there can be a widening rather than a
reduction in disparities (Eaton et al. 2010; Prud’homme 1995).
Evidence in fact suggests that ‘decentralisation has done little to im-
prove the quantity, quality or equity of public services in the (Sub-
Saharan Africa) region’ (Conyers 2007, p. 21). Potential threats with
implications for community-participation within the politics of
priority-setting, and protective measures, can be considered in light of
Walt and Gilson’s health policy analysis framework according to the
context, process, actors and content of reforms for priority-setting, as
summarized in Table 1 (Conyers 1983; Prud’homme 1995; Cheema
and Rondinelli 2007; Walt and Gilson 1994; Bossert and Mitchell
2011; Bossert 2015).
Capacity and accountability are vital for the success of decentral-
ization (Bossert and Mitchell 2011). Where these are not sufficiently
established prior to decentralization of functions, there is the risk
that decision-making actors do not have sufficient capacity to take
advantage of the new decision space available to them (Cheema and
Rondinelli 2007), and of ‘elite capture’, where powers that have
been decentralized do not empower the general community but in-
stead go to a local elite (Conyers 1983; Mills 1990), who may then
exploit priority-setting in order to consolidate political support and
maximize voter base (Goddard et al. 2006). This may both exclude
marginalized people from playing a role in making decisions relating
to their health and lead to the setting of priorities which do not con-
tribute towards attaining universal health coverage (UHC).
Kenyan health system and devolution
Health service delivery in Kenya is organized around the new Kenya
Essential Package for Health (KEPH) (Ministry of Medical Services
and Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation 2012), according to a
four level system as described in the current national Health Policy,
which indicates Kenya’s commitment to UHC. Kenya’s national
health policy is operationalized according to the Kenya Health
Sector Strategic and Investment Plan (2014–2018) (Republic of
Kenya 2014). Kenya devolved services1 (including health) in 2013
from a single central government to 47 new sub-national govern-
ments, known as counties (see Box 1). Devolution reforms occurred
in response to widespread frustrations with inefficiencies and inequi-
ties with the former centralized government and growing local and
international pressure following post-election violence in 2007–
2008 (Cornell and D’Arcy 2014; Tsofa et al. 2017b). Inequities in
Kenya are rooted in the historical and social structural forces origi-
nating from colonization, and contribute to widely varied levels of
poverty, education, development, resource allocation and invest-
ment for infrastructure and human resources (Ministry of Health
2014; Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and ICF Macro 2014;
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and Society for International
Development 2013; Ministry of Health [Kenya] and World Health
Organisation 2013). Devolution in Kenya therefore seeks to ‘tackle
long- term, deeply entrenched disparities between regions; increase
the responsiveness and accountability of government to citizens;
allow greater autonomy to different regions and groups, and re-
balance power away from a historically strong central government’
(Kenya School of Government and The World Bank 2015, p. 2).
The Constitution outlined a 3 year transition of functions from
national to county governments (National Council for Law
Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney-General 2010).
However, in response to pressure from the county governments all
functions to be undertaken in counties were transferred in June
2013, just four months after county level elections (held in March
2013) and before county government structures had been fully
established to carry out these functions (Tsofa et al. 2017b). This
unplanned adoption of a ‘big-bang’ approach with reforms occur-
ring nationwide provided little transition time or scope to learn les-
sons in advance (Overseas Development Institute 2016).
Equity in healthcare in Kenya
Since reducing inequities is a central objective for devolution accord-
ing to the Constitution 2010, it is important to assess the implica-
tions of these reforms for equity of healthcare. Namely whether
there are systematic disparities in access and use of healthcare serv-
ices, and/or equity in health financing, where equity is defined as
when people contribute to healthcare payments based on their abil-
ity, and benefit from healthcare based on their need. For example,
allocations across sub-counties or health services should be based on
healthcare needs of the population/region. In order to address some
Key Messages
• Devolution changes power dynamics and relationships, presenting sub-national authorities with greater decision space
and the potential for improved equity.
• Common decentralization aims to increase citizen participation, accountability, efficiency and equity are not likely to be
achieved if sub-national levels do not have the capacity to make wise decisions or respect for accountability
mechanisms.
• Kenyan county governments have often prioritized visible health interventions which appeal to their electorate, leading
to over-emphasis on curative health services with neglect of preventive services, including community health
approaches.
• Devolution in Kenya appears to have improved equity between counties, but inequities persist within counties.
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of the inequities between geographic regions, Kenya has introduced
changes to resource allocation, through transfer of the equitable
share funding from central government to county governments,
determined by the commission for revenue allocation formula
(Commission on revenue allocation 2016), which takes into account
each county’s poverty level, along with an equalization fund for for-
merly marginalized counties (National Council for Law Reporting
with the Authority of the Attorney-General 2010). Formerly
marginalized counties now therefore benefit from higher levels of
funding, along with the decision space to invest in health. There are
few published studies of county level priority-setting processes fol-
lowing devolution in Kenya. However, a recent study conducted in
one county found that in the year following the introduction of de-
volution, there was limited community or stakeholder involvement
in the process (Tsofa et al. 2017b). In addition, removal of user fees
combined with delayed release of funds from the county treasury
Table 1. Threats and protective measures influencing the success of devolution reforms
Threat Protective measure
Context This political process occurs within and is influenced by the so-
cial, economic and political context. Historical norms may
permit nepotism and corruption, may continue and thrive
unless challenged by transparent and strong accountability
mechanisms.
The ‘handing over’ of responsibilities between levels is a political
process, influenced by the unique social, economic and political
context within which reforms occur. Ideally reform process
should be carefully planned out in advance and take place over
time. Knowledge and recognition of the context and introduc-
tions of actions to challenge existing norms should be put in
place to ensure distribution of funds which takes into consider-
ation the underlying county poverty level and ability to raise suf-
ficient local revenue.
Process Resistance to the reform process by central government actors,
may contribute to ineffective implementation and failure to
build capacity for local government.
Strong and committed political leadership at national and sub-na-
tional levels, with willingness to share power, authority and fi-
nancial resources.
Lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities by actors will hin-
der transparency and contribute to confusion within the pri-
ority-setting process.
Clear understanding at each level of rights, expected standards,
roles and responsibilities
Actors Limited administrative and management capacity within local
government, may deepen inequalities between formerly
marginalized and non-marginalized areas
Actions planned in advance of reforms to build adequate institu-
tional capacity for administrative, technical, organizational, fi-
nancial and human resource management across the system and
at individual level.
Failure to address power imbalances between actors within
counties may lead to entrenchment of influence in favour of
local elites and continued exclusion of vulnerable individuals
from priority-setting processes.
Accountability measures should be established in advance, which
are responsive to local civil society preferences, while still ensur-
ing improved population health and health sector performance.
Content If poorly planned, devolution may contribute to the selection of
priorities which increase disparities.
If well planned with needed capacity and accountability measures
in place there is opportunity to reduce inequities and promote
UHC.
Box 1. Overview of Kenya’s health system
Country context
Kenya, a lower–middle-income country situated in East Africa, has an estimated population of 46.05 million (2015 esti-
mates). Communicable diseases still make up the leading causes of death, but NCDs are creating an increasing burden on
the health system.
Governance
Since 2013 Kenya operates with a devolved system of governance, with 47 sub-national authorities known as counties and
a wide range of governance roles and responsibilities devolved to county level (see Table 1).
At the county level there are two arms of government—the CEC (who have responsibility to implement legislation, manage
functions of the county administration and its departments and any other functions mandated by the Constitution) and the
county assembly (who have powers of enacting legislation at county, provide oversight to the executive and approve plans
and policies for resource management).
Health service delivery
Health service delivery level is organized around a four level system, (1) community services, (2) primary health services,
(3) county referral services and (4) national referral services. County authorities are responsible for providing services in
levels one to three and national level is responsible for providing national referral services. Community health services,
form the first level in the health system and underpin Kenya’s plan for attaining UHC.
Sources: Ministry of Medical Services, Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation, 2012. Kenya Health Policy 2012–2030.
Nairobi, Kenya; National Council for Law Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney-General, 2010. The Constitution of
Kenya. Nairobi, Kenya; http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kenya/overview.
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resulted in challenges with financial management at health facility
level, leading some health facility in-charges to re-introduce user
fees in order to continue providing services, with implications for
the poorest service users (Nyikuri et al. 2015).
Priority-setting
Priority-setting arises as a consequence of the needs and demands for
healthcare resources (such as budget, staff time, equipment and facili-
ties) exceeding the resources available, requiring some means of choos-
ing between competing demands (Mitton 2002). Policymakers need to
balance both the need to set priorities fairly and efficiently with safe-
guarding citizens’ right to health (Rumbold et al. 2017). Earlier studies
of priority-setting following devolution in Kenya have revealed a limited
role for citizens and technical staff (particularly within hospitals) within
the process, limited capacity at sub-national level (for coordinating com-
munity health services) and importance of political influence, use of
power and visibility regarding the priorities selected (Lipsky et al. 2015;
Overseas Development Institute 2016; Barasa et al. 2016; HECTA
Consulting 2015; Tsofa et al. 2017a,b). The changing roles and respon-
sibilities for these health actors across health systems levels before and
after devolution are shown in Table 2.
Community health services in Kenya
According to all major health policies and strategies in Kenya, county
authorities have a legal mandate to provide community health services as
the first tier in the health system (Ministry of Medical Services and
Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation 2012; Ministry of Health
[Kenya] 2014a,b). When adequately supported by the health system and
strong community structures, community health workers (CHWs) can
promote equitable access and use of health promotion, disease preven-
tion and curative services at community and facility levels, thereby play-
ing a central role in the drive towards UHC (Tulenko et al. 2013). By
linking communities with the health system, CHWs have the potential to
re-dress power imbalances and generate community empowerment,
Table 2. Main roles and responsibilities for national and sub-national structures for community health planning before and after devolution
Pre-devolution Post-devolution
National Health policy and strategy
Quality assurance and standards
Training health staff, including CHEWs
Coordinating community health partners
Budgeting and allocating resources (community health predom-
inantly NGO funded)
Recruitment and management of community health workforce
(CHEWs)
Health policy; revised community health strategy
Quality assurance and standards
Capacity building and technical assistance for counties (al-
though unclear communication and training channels)
No longer coordinating partners, budgeting or recruiting
workforce
Province Direct link with national
Guiding annual planning at district level, including for commu-
nity health activities
Supervision of community health activities
Does not exist
County Did not exist Development of CIDP (may/may not include community
health)
Budgeting and allocating resources (including for commu-
nity health)
Service delivery for public health, disease surveillance, com-
munity health services, primary health services, ambu-
lance, county hospital services
Recruitment and management of CHEWS
Decision on stipend for CHVs
Coordinating with partners (including for community
health)
District/
sub-county
Annual planning and budgeting, including community health
activities in coordination with partners
Control of district budget
Implementation of public health, disease surveillance, commu-
nity health services, primary health services, ambulance, dis-
trict hospital services
Annual planning and budgeting, including community
health activities in coordination with partners
No longer controlling budgets
Implementation of public health, disease surveillance, am-
bulance, community health services, primary health serv-
ices, county hospital services
CHEWs and
CHVs
Develop annual workplan and budget in collaboration with
community health committee and share with health facility
in-charge
Develop annual workplan and budget in collaboration with
community health committee and share with health facil-
ity in-charge
CHVs can attend and participate during public participa-
tion meetings
Community
members
Role for all community members during dialogue days with
actions developed
Community representation during community health commit-
tee, health facility management committee, quarterly district
stakeholder meetings
Role for all community members during dialogue days with
actions developed
Community representation during community health com-
mittee, health facility management committee, quarterly
district stakeholder meetings
Involvement during public participation meetings
Roles that changed after devolution are in italics and unchanged roles are in plain text.
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particularly within lower–middle income countries (McCollum et al.
2016; Kok et al. 2016). Within Kenya, CHWs have been shown to sig-
nificantly increase the use of health services at household, community
and facility level (Olayo et al. 2014), providing pro-poor delivery of
prompt and effective malaria treatment (Siekmans et al. 2013).
However, coverage with community-based services is uneven, often
donor driven and not necessarily based on need (McCollum et al. 2016)
and therefore may be open to manipulation, as part of a complex
system.
Shortly after devolution, the Kenyan national community health
and development unit revised the community health strategy. Kenya
has two main types of CHW—community health volunteers (CHVs)
and salaried community health extension workers (CHEWs). The
structure and role for CHVs and CHEWs changed in response to
identification of gaps and challenges with the prior strategy
(McCollum et al. 2016). The decision space created by devolution
presents the opportunity for counties to address disparities, by plan-
ning and budgeting to adapt the new community health strategy
according to local county context and disease burden. In response to
the limited evidence surrounding priority-setting for community
health to date, we sought to explore priority-setting context, content,
processes and actors (Walt and Gilson 1994). The introduction of de-
volution raises a host of questions which we have sought to explore,
including: Is health equity considered when health priorities are set?
How has devolution influenced the equity of health services? How
has devolution influenced the provision of community health serv-
ices? By answering these questions we aim to identify implications
for community health and equity between and within counties, from
a range of perspectives in the immediate period following devolution.
Methods
Methods and approach
We adopted a naturalistic research paradigm using multiple qualita-
tive methods to observe changes and understand the process, power
and politics at play within priority-setting and implications for com-
munity health and equity following devolution in Kenya. Key
informant interviews, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions
(FGDs) were used to capture a range of perspectives, including ‘trad-
itional’ policymakers along with voices typically ‘unheard’ in policy
discussions. The research was conducted together with LVCT Health,
a Kenyan institution, embedded in Kenyan policy and practice.
Site and respondent selection
Ten counties were selected in order to include diversity between the
counties studied by ensuring that counties selected represented a
mixture of marginalized and non-marginalized counties [according
to those identified as marginalized and receiving the additional
equalization fund from national government (Business Daily 2013)],
a range of poverty levels, geographic settings and health service
coverage levels (see Table 3). Interviews with 269 individuals and 14
FGDs with an additional 146 participants were conducted in total
between March 2015 and April 2016 (see Table 4). Fourteen nation-
al level key informants were selected purposively using a snowball
approach to identify other potential respondents who could contrib-
ute valuable information. In-depth interviews with 120 purposively
selected county level decision-makers were conducted in 10 diverse
counties to include politicians involved with decision-making for
health, county treasury staff involved with budget guidance, gender
and children’s office representatives, county executive committee
(CEC) members for health, chief officers for health and technical
decision-makers, including members of the county health manage-
ment team. Interviews with 49 health workers from sub-county,
health facility and community levels were carried out in 3 counties,
with 86 interviews with CHVs, CHEWs, their supervisors and com-
munity members in 2 counties (see Table 4). Voices of multiple
stakeholders were included to capture varied perspectives in relation
to community health, which are often unheard following devolution
reforms (Masanyiwa et al. 2015).
Development of data collection tool and analysis
We developed a topic guide based upon aspects of the
Accountability for Reasonableness Framework which recognizes the
importance of fair process for priority-setting according to the
Table 3. Key indices for study counties
County Marginalizeda/not
marginalized
Poverty incidence
(headcount ratio)b
Rural/urban Province Live births in previous 5 years
% delivered by skilled providerc
% children age
12–23 months who
are fully vaccinatedc
Homa Bay Not marginalized 48.4% Rural agrarian Nyanza 60.4% 53.7%
Kajiado Not marginalized 38.0% Rural nomadic Rift Valley 63.2% 48.9%
Kituid Not marginalized 60.4% Rural agrarian Eastern 46.2% 52.7%
Kwale Marginalized 70.7% Rural agrarian Coast 50.1% 82.0%
Marsabite Marginalized 75.8% Rural nomadic Eastern 25.8% 66.6%
Meru Not marginalized 31.0% Rural agrarian Eastern 82.8% 78.3%
Nairobid Not marginalized 21.8% Urban Nairobi 89.1% 60.4%
Nyeri Not marginalized 27.6% Rural agrarian Central 88.1% 77.8%
Turkana Marginalized 87.5% Rural nomadic Rift Valley 22.8% 56.7%
Vihiga Not marginalized 38.9% Rural agrarian Western 50.3% 90.9%
National average 45.2% 61.8% 67.5%
aCounties considered marginalized are those which receive the additional equalization fund for the fourteen most marginalized counties in the country.
bKenya National Bureau of Statistics. Economic Survey. Nairobi, Kenya; 2014.
cKenya National Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Health, National AIDS Control Council, Kenya Medical Research Institute, National Council for Population
and Development. Kenya Demographic and Health Survey: Key Indicators. Nairobi, Kenya; 2014.
dInterviews also carried out with health workers from sub-county, health facility and community level and interviews with CHVs, CHEWs, their supervisors
and FGDs with community members.
eInterviews also carried out with health workers from sub-county, health facility and community level.
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relevance of priority-setting process to meet health needs within rea-
sonable resource constraints; ‘publicity’ and transparency of priority
setting process, priorities and their rationale to all those affected by
them; opportunity for challenge of decisions through appeals and re-
vision mechanisms and enforcement/leadership and public regula-
tion to ensure that the other conditions have been met (Daniels and
Sabin 2002). We used questions to explore the new priority-setting
process for community health within counties, the actors involved in
making decisions, the values and factors which influence priority-
setting, influence of devolution on community health services and
health equity. A framework approach to analysis was used to clas-
sify and organize data according to themes, concepts and emerging
categories (Ritchie and Lewis 2003). This included an inductive ap-
proach to enable meaning to emerge from the data through familiar-
ization by reading and rereading transcripts before development of
the coding framework, based upon prior knowledge of literature,
topic guide themes and issues raised by respondents themselves.
NVivo10 software was used to code and manage data.
Quality assurance
Qualitative data were recorded with the participants’ consent and
transcribed verbatim. Discussions and interviews conducted in
Kiswahili or Kikamba were translated to English, with a selection
back-translated for quality-checking. Data collection continued until
saturation was reached and data were triangulated between sources
to minimize bias. The main interviewer for national, county and
health worker interviews was a foreign researcher, with community
and CHW interviews and discussions carried out by Kenyan
researchers. Being part of an embedded Kenyan institution with
regular discussions, presentations with colleagues and other
researchers within and outside Kenya and reflection of our different
positions as UK and Kenyan researchers were an important part of
strengthening validity throughout the research process.
Conceptual framework and ethics
Results are presented in line with a conceptual framework based on
study findings and adapted from a number of existing frameworks
(see Figure 1) (Walt and Gilson 1994; Tanahashi 1978; Brinkerhoff
and Bossert 2008; Daniels and Sabin 2002). This seeks to link gov-
ernance reform principles supportive of community health, model
for health policy analysis, the Accountability for Reasonableness
process conditions and the influence of the content of priorities
selected on the availability, affordability, accessibility, acceptability,
use and quality of services provided. Ethical approval was received
Table 4. Respondent demographics
Male Female # respondents
{G1}National key informant interviews
County representative for CEC forum at national level 1 0 1
National Ministry of Health 6 1 7
NGO/research institute/ donor 4 2 6
Total national respondents 11 3 14
{G1}County level in-depth interviews (ten counties)
CEC member for health 6 3 9
Chief officer for health 7 3 10
Director/deputy director for health 17 2 19
CHMT member 19 13 32
Total county level health respondents 49 21 70
Children’s office representative 7 3 10
Gender representative 6 4 10
Member of county assembly (or representative) 15 5 20
County treasury representative 6 0 6
Other county informants 3 1 4
Total county level non-health respondents 37 13 50
{G1}Multi-level in depth interviews (three counties)
CHEW/CHV 6 6 12
Health facility in-charge 8 9 17
Hospital in-charge 6 0 6
NGO coordinator based at county level 1 0 1
Sub-county community health focal person 5 2 7
Sub-county medical officer 5 1 6
Total multi-level respondents 32 17 49
{G1}Community health in-depth interviews (two counties)
CHV 12 12 24
CHEW 4 2 7a
Community health committee member 8 6 14
CHV team leader 4 9 13
Health facility in-charge 4 3 7
Sub-county community health focal person 3 1 4
Community key informants 11 6 17
Total IDI respondents 46 39 86
Total participants 175 93 269
{G1}Community member FGDs (two counties)
FGDs 7 7 14
aUnrecorded gender one respondent.
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from Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI) and Liverpool
School of Tropical Medicine, with research permit from National
Commission for Science Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI).
Results
Context of reforms
Kenya, a geographically, culturally, economically and disease bur-
den diverse country experiences wide variations in health service
coverage, care-seeking practices and mortality rates across counties,
as has been described according to the literature in the background
section. Study respondents commonly felt many of these disparities
were a consequence of the former centralized government.
Equity . . . in fact that is one of the things why devolution was
formed in Kenya, because there was a lot of concentration of
resources or even health care facilities in some areas more than
the others (County Health Respondent, Male20).
Almost all respondents felt devolution was driven by the desire
to bring services closer to the community and to address inequities,
with actions having been introduced across counties with the aim of
addressing these goals. We also found frequent examples where low
accountability and failure to address the norms, structures and dis-
criminations which drive inequality such as corruption, tribalism,
patronage and patriarchal norms, have led to neglect of certain com-
munities even after devolution.
Let me just say our village is among those that have been. . .
neglected. . . and this is brought about by political differences. . .
You find that village, because they did not choose that councillor
or member of county assembly, it’s neglected (Nairobi Male
CHW team leader03).
Process of reforms for priority-setting for community
health
Devolution in Kenya brought rapid transfer of authority and
responsibilities to county governments, including planning,
budgeting, implementation and management of health services
for community and primary health care and referral up to county
level. The introduction of devolution in Kenya led to changing
roles and power for actors across the health system (see Table 2),
with reduced role for national level in coordinating partners, re-
cruitment and management of health workers and planning for
budget allocation, but retained responsibility for policy develop-
ment, quality assurance and provision of national referral (Level
4) services. The former district level (now largely considered
similar to the sub-county level, although there are also some
counties which were former districts) which prior to devolution
had responsibility for annual planning and budget allocation for
management of user fees continues to hold responsibility to im-
plement and deliver health services, but no longer has control
over budget allocation (Tsofa et al. 2017b; Nyikuri et al. 2017).
Unfortunately, there has been a lack of clear and transparent
guidance from national level to guide the process or roles and
responsibilities (see Supplementary material).
According to the Constitution of Kenya (2010), county level
actors are now responsible for budget allocation and annual
Figure 1. Conceptual framework
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planning as well as developing the 5-year county integrated develop-
ment plan (CIDP) and the 5-year county strategic plan for health.
These plans should align with national health policy and strategic
planning documents, including community health strategy guidance
(Ministry of Health [Kenya] 2014b). County level also hold responsi-
bility for health service delivery for level one to three services (com-
munity, primary and county referral services), recruitment and
management of health workers and coordination of partners. Within
the county, a number of actors are engaged in the priority-setting
process for the annual budget and planning cycle (see Figure 2).
Officially, the annual planning and budgeting cycle should be
guided by the 5-year CIDP and county strategic plan for health, under
the oversight of the county treasury (see Figure 2). According to guid-
ance this process should follow a series of agreed steps, with the CEC
member for health leading the development of an annual plan and
budget for health, which is then amalgamated with the respective plans
and budgets for the other county departments, to create the county an-
nual plan and budget, in accordance with the CIDP and available
budget, allowing opportunity for community participation to identify
needs and priorities. This is first approved by the CEC, before it is
shared with the legislative arm of government (the county assembly),
who should validate the community priorities, before it is approved and
publicized. Unfortunately, the process for how priorities should be
weighed and compared was unclear, allowing for greater influence of
local politics (see Power and capacity of actors and implications for
community health section).
At community level, citizens should be engaged through a com-
bination of new and pre-existing avenues, including participation
through new public participation forums carried out as part of the
county annual planning and budgeting process and inclusion of
community inputs through community dialogue days (community
level health-related discussions, using locally generated community
data which should be facilitated by CHEWs and CHVs); inclusion
of community representation in community health committees,
health facility management committees and quarterly health stake-
holder meetings which ought to feed into the county prioritization
process. Barriers to citizen engagement are described below and in
the Supplementary material.
Power and capacity of actors and implications for
community health
Overwhelmingly, the findings from this study relate to capacity and
power. Limited technical, political and community capacity for
county priority-setting was identified as a challenge by national level
respondents, and to a lesser degree by technical decision-makers at
county and health facility levels. The expertise of key technical
decision-makers who lead the priority-setting process, such as the
CEC member for health or chief officer for health was felt to be of
critical importance. Experience ranged from no health-related ex-
perience, purely clinical experience to strong public health experi-
ence, between counties. Technical decision-makers felt inadequate
public health experience impedes wise priority-setting, which
Figure 2. County level annual planning and budgeting cycle
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reflects and balances both preventive and curative needs, including
community health approaches. Similarly, community members and
powerful political decision-makers were perceived to have limited
understanding of health, restricting their ability to recognize import-
ant priorities.
As a consequence of the rapid transition of power and resources,
communication channels between national and county authorities
were unclear, leading to mistrust between actors at both levels.
There was limited capacity building, clarity or guidance surrounding
the uncharted roles and responsibilities for new decision-making
actors at county and community levels. This hindered transparent
and accountable priority-setting processes (see Supplementary ma-
terial), allowing space for opportunistic actors to seize power, con-
tributing to selection of ‘high-vote’ priorities. In many counties we
found a preference (particularly by politicians) for high visibility
curative interventions above preventive health services, including
community health actions.
Many of them (politicians) see the importance of curative services
but they do not see the strength or the importance of the health
promotion, public health activities, and therefore getting finan-
cial allocation to that department has been a challenge. Because
. . .they make decisions based on votes, will this get me more
votes? So they do not tend to see that when we prevent malaria
or prevent diarrhoea that you are going to get votes (County
Health Respondent, Male02).
Public participation forums provide a mechanism for community
involvement in identifying and setting priorities. While reported by
policy players as key mechanisms to strengthen accountability to the
community, most county governments have not yet addressed the
factors which influence meaningful engagement (see Supplementary
material), including the multiple barriers faced by ‘disadvantaged
groups’ to engaging in these processes. Neither has they adequately
informed citizens about their rights, provided them with needed in-
formation for making decisions or explained their role within
priority-setting. This has contributed to community confusion about
participation, dominance of local elite or possible manipulation of
community members when identifying priorities.
Those who have been given that responsibility to inform the gov-
ernment, they don’t reach out to the citizens. . . So who will you
report all those challenges to? (Nairobi Female FGD01)
There was also limited evidence in the majority of counties for
action to empower citizens to understand health holistically, includ-
ing the need for a balance of preventive, promotive, curative and re-
habilitative services. As a result of this limited knowledge by
community members there is the threat, which was identified by
many technical actors from the majority of counties, that commu-
nity members may prioritize curative services over preventive and
promotive ones. This will be important to address moving forward
in light of the increasing non-communicable disease (NCD) burden
and the vital importance of taking action to prevent NCDs.
. . .they (community) need to have a wider perspective of how
[health is] not just a hospital (County Health Respondent,
Male50).
Mechanisms for community empowerment through ownership
of local data were not commonly described by county decision-
makers as forming part of the priority-setting process. Established
mechanisms, such as dialogue days were hindered by donor de-
pendence, where community participation dropped whenever
donor support for meetings ended (see Supplementary material),
limiting opportunity for transfer of power into the hands of the
community through community-led data monitoring. These chal-
lenges were experienced by most counties. Although, we found
positive examples of community empowerment around priority-
setting, which resulted in community members’ identification of
the need for community-based health services and was then
reflected within the annual plan and budget (see Box 2, example
2). There is scope for further study to unpack how different com-
munity members are involved within this process and in other
county contexts.
Box 2. Examples of best practice: stronger, more equitable community health priority setting
1. In a formerly marginalized county with a large nomadic population, low rates of skilled delivery prior to devolution, with long dis-
tances between populations and their closest health facility, where citizens often cross international borders, actions have been intro-
duced to strengthen community health services. The community health strategy has been modified to ensure that a CHV is recruited
from within each community, who then moves with their community and has the ability to use a satellite phone (originally provided
for reasons of insecurity) to communicate with members of the health team in the event of an obstetric emergency. In addition, this
county has decentralized authority to use facility improvement funds to hospitals and is planning for further decentralization to lower
levels. Actors from this county self-identified a capacity gap within the county technical priority-setting team and in response ensured
that all county level decision making actors underwent appropriate leadership training.
2. In another formerly marginalized agrarian county, community members had repeatedly requested infrastructure and ambulances,
with no requests for community health actions during public participation meetings in the initial two years after devolution. County
level technical actors introduced extensive measures to educate and empower the community to understand health holistically and to
inform ‘powerful’ decision-makers such as members of county assembly about the politically appealing aspects of community health
interventions. As a result, equity-promoting community health activities were identified as priorities by community members and
received funding from the county government for the first time. In this county, the CEC member for health holds advanced public
health qualifications, appreciates community health and adopts a ‘power with’ approach to priority-setting, by encouraging discus-
sion and engagement by actors across the health system and community levels.
3. Meanwhile, in a county with a high burden of NCD CHVs have been trained to screen for and refer patients with hypertension to
their closest health facility. The county executive member for health was extremely supportive of community health and had gener-
ated political support sharing the concept with the governor and other members of the CEC.
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Supplementary material highlights further accountability mecha-
nisms identified by respondents which should guide priority-setting
for health according to policy (first column) and some of the barriers
experienced with their adoption (second column). There is need for
stronger accountability mechanisms and learning from best practice
to ensure policy objectives are met (recommendations column).
Content of priorities set for community health
We found varied appreciation for community health services by pol-
iticians and/or community members, at times depending upon the
extent to which they were empowered to understand health holistic-
ally (see above). This has led to inconsistent investment in health
promotion and disease prevention post-devolution and uneven com-
munity health service coverage. This was felt to relate to influential
leaders’ appreciation for these services and ability to engage and in-
form other decision-makers about the benefits and need for
community-based health services.
Community health is very advocacy driven. You find the counties
that have done well in community health are the ones that have
very strong, enthusiastic and well-connected county community
health strategy focal person (National Respondent, Female08).
The national role for building capacity and developing policy fol-
lowing devolution is clear. We found, however, that the extent to
which counties must follow these directives remains ambiguous.
Following revision of the community health strategy in 2014 (after
devolution), the lack of clarity surrounding how counties should fol-
low the new national guidance has contributed to differences be-
tween the content, quality and functionality of the package of
community health services provided between counties. This may po-
tentially widen coverage gaps for pro-equity community health serv-
ices. Quality gaps often pre-dated devolution and were commonly
identified in both health facility and community level services.
Respondents, particularly from CHW levels, identified limited re-
fresher training for CHVs, absence of CHV kits and supplies, limited
investment in funds to support supervision activities and lack of
commensurate recruitment of CHEWs alongside expansion of
CHVs (where present).
Implications for health equity and community health
Health equity between counties was felt to have improved (by nation-
al key informants and respondents from formerly marginalized coun-
ties). Within counties, there is evidence of diversion and dilution of
equity perspectives with wide variation in distribution of funds be-
tween areas, with some counties attempting to adopt pro-equity distri-
bution which favours poorer and underserved areas. Meanwhile,
other counties provide equal distribution of funding regardless of
underlying level of need. This is further complicated by local power
dynamics, with more powerful politicians found to influence the dis-
tribution of investment, typically leading to more infrastructure within
their home area, compared with less powerful politicians, regardless
of underlying level of need (see Supplementary material).
Devolution provides county authorities an opportunity to push
towards context-specific approaches for achieving UHC, by modify-
ing CHV distribution according to population density and/or ter-
rain. In keeping with these ideals, we found examples of local
innovation where community health services have been modified
according to the local disease burden, for example CHV screening
for hypertension in a high NCD burden area (see Box 2). Around
half of the counties studied have seized the opportunity devolution
presents to invest and/or innovate community health service delivery
by expanding coverage and/or providing stipend for CHVs.
Meanwhile, the remaining counties have done little more than con-
tinue to pay salaries for CHEWs already in post, leading to stagna-
tion or deterioration of these services since devolution. This was
typically felt to be related to limited capacity and political preference
for infrastructure over health promotion and disease prevention
interventions, stunting progress towards equity.
Our problems are mainly in the communities that are in the low in-
come levels. But now, when you look at our budget you find that
we want to construct a very big hospital. These people might not
even come to this hospital. The issues they have are very basic,
maybe even just provision of supply of clean water. You supply
clean water, and 50% of their issues are [solved], they don’t need
that hospital. So I believe when it comes to equitable distribution,
we are not doing that (County Health Respondent, Male30).
In addition to the variation in coverage of community health services
there has been limited emphasis on the need for quality services, with
many respondents identifying a deterioration in quality since devolution.
Only 1 of the 10 study counties identified that improving the functionality
of existing community health units was a county priority. The lack of pri-
ority for quality community health services was felt to be a consequence
of partial adoption of aspects of the revised strategy, with failure to in-
crease the number of CHEWs alongside reducing numbers of CHVs; var-
ied CHV performance, with many CHVs reluctant to work in the
absence of receiving a stipend; (although respondents from some counties
described county government plans to introduce a CHV stipend); limited
county government investment to provide CHVs with refresher trainings
or supportive supervision and limited supplies and tools.
Discussion
Devolution in Kenya was politically driven, motivated by the desire
to share power and resources across regions, so as to remedy histor-
ical inequities, along with objectives to increase citizen participation
and accountability (National Council for Law Reporting with the
Authority of the Attorney-General 2010; Cornell and D’Arcy 2014).
It appears to have had some positive implications for health equity
in previously neglected counties, with increased funding available
and expansion of service availability. However, the rapidity of the
process, limited technical capacity, guidance, political will for com-
munity health and the dominance of powerful county level actors
has meant that decision-making and prioritization have been cap-
tured for political and power interests, similar to Indonesia’s ‘big-
bang’ devolution of the late 1990s (Local Development
International 2013). The aim of promoting more equitable and re-
sponsive services has not yet been sufficiently realized in the years
immediately following devolution. Less visible community health
services, including CHWs and health prevention, promotion and re-
ferral have often been neglected in the prioritization process.
Notable best practice examples (see Box 2), demonstrate several
characteristics in contrast to the norms across other counties, and in
keeping with Brinkerhoff and Bossert’s (2008) principles for imple-
menting health reforms (Brinkerhoff and Bossert 2008), including:
self-identified and driven capacity building for technical priority-
setting actors; sharing of priority-setting power with community
level actors to generate demand for community health services and
political will among political actors.
Context
Kenya’s devolution objectives are in keeping within those commonly
described globally, focusing on citizens’ empowerment, promotion
of national unity and eradication of inequalities (National Council
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for Law Reporting with the Authority of the Attorney-General
2010). These objectives were in part a response seeking to alleviate
the effects of structural forces such as colonization, which had led to
the ethnocentrism fuelled violence during 2007 elections and the
resulting long-standing inequities based on geographic location or
tribe (Akoth 2011). Central government have introduced measures
which promote the redistribution of funds towards formerly
marginalized areas, through the equitable share fund and equal-
ization fund for formerly marginalized counties. Despite these pro-
equity efforts, we find that in keeping with two recent Kenyan stud-
ies (Cornell and D’Arcy 2014; D’Arcy and Cornell 2016), and across
other global contexts (Ramiro et al. 2001; Avelino et al. 2014), pa-
tronage norms (which often have tribal associations) have not yet
been eradicated within the county, having implications for the avail-
ability, use and quality of services by individuals who are most
marginalized. Similar to the Philippines (Langran 2011), the Kenyan
national Ministry of Health’s role is still in flux, with unclear com-
munication channels and use of incentives or sanctions to guide sub-
national priority-setting. Opportunities for national government to
encourage county investment in pro-equity community health serv-
ices, e.g. through conditional grants, could be explored.
Process
In keeping with global literature, our findings highlight that devolu-
tion is a process which takes time and needs to be linked to building
relevant capacities at subnational levels, and financial resources,
with relevant accountability structures and strategies in place to en-
sure community engagement to address diverse needs and priorities.
The rapidity of the process, occurring in a matter of months rather
than years as anticipated, has created challenges with ensuring clar-
ity of roles and responsibilities by all actors, and in priority setting,
as also noted by Tsofa et al. (2017a,b). Strategic planning was aban-
doned due to the absence of key actors needed for the planning and
budgeting process, followed by budget development by the treasury
without the active participation of the department of health and in
the absence of an annual workplan (Tsofa et al. 2017b). There is
need for a more considered approach to the priority-setting process
within devolution, which takes into account the seven principles for
priority-setting: stakeholder involvement, stakeholder empower-
ment, transparency, revisions, use of evidence, enforcement and in-
corporation of community values (Barasa et al. 2015).
Actors
Our findings are in keeping with those from other devolved settings,
where powerful actors can capture the decision-making process,
resulting in exclusion of marginalized groups if underlying power
structures and norms, such as patronage networks, are not addressed
alongside reforms (Kilewo and Frumence 2015). Stronger community
empowerment is needed, which addresses these norms by promoting
‘power within’ by disadvantaged community members, and encour-
ages a ‘power with’ expression of power by ‘ordinary’ community
actors within priority-setting (VeneKlasen et al. 2002). This will need
specific actions to ensure inclusion of ‘disadvantaged groups’, stand-
ards placed on local governments and elimination of knowledge
imbalances between actors participating in public participation
forums. We provide examples of recommendations to strengthen ac-
countability mechanisms in the Supplementary material.
Limited decision-making capacity at sub-national levels is a
recognized threat to the success of devolution (Bossert and Beauvais
2002; Langran 2011), constraining ability for effective management
and contributing to sub-optimal decisions. We find that limited
expertise and leadership capacity at county level has hindered the
priority-setting process, in keeping with previous studies (Bossert
and Mitchell 2011), which places constraints on their ability to
carry-out effective health management and may lead to sub-optimal
decisions as occurred in Tanzania and the Philippines (Frumence
et al. 2013; Langran 2011; Bossert et al. 2000).
Content
Our findings suggest that equity between counties is improving,
with fairer pro-poor funding distribution by central government,
who have learnt from other contexts, such as the Philippines, who
did not take poverty level into consideration (Langran 2011). Equity
within counties, however, is unclear as a lack of sufficient safe-
guards has in some cases led to replication of the previous
centralized government’s norms, discriminations and inequities.
Global findings indicate that policymakers seek to direct resources
towards the median voter position (Goddard et al. 2006), which
may lead to neglect of the public health workforce (Liu et al. 2006)
or minority groups, such as those living in sparsely populated no-
madic areas (Overseas Development Institute 2016). A strong equity
focus is needed, which will expand access and increase demand for
context-appropriate community-based promotive, preventive, cura-
tive and rehabilitative health, monitoring the needs of disadvantaged
groups and coverage of key public health services (e.g. human
resources for curative and preventive care) and indicators (e.g.
immunization rates). Community health in Kenya continues to be
largely externally funded by United Nations agencies, e.g. UNICEF,
and partner organizations, even where county governments are
investing. This risks exacerbating inequities in community health
coverage and gives increased scope for manipulation at all levels, al-
though examples of innovation are emerging (see Box 2).
As respondents have highlighted many of the leading health issues
relate to social determinants of health, such as environmental factors
relating to availability of clean water and sanitation. There is need
for intersectoral collaboration, particularly for health promotion and
disease prevention, between health and other departments within the
county to address the social determinants of health and reduce citi-
zens exposure to risks for ill health, particularly among ‘vulnerable’
groups. This has implications for the need for collaboration and fi-
nancial allocation from other sectors. CHWs, positioned at the inter-
face between the community and the health system, are potentially
key actors in the process of pursuing UHC both in terms of extending
services and as ‘agents of change’ with regard to social determinants
as culturally and socially embedded members of their community (R
McCollum et al. 2016; Kok et al. 2017). They will require support
from their community and health system to enable this (Kok et al.
2016). Since decentralization health facility funds are typically
delayed and often are lower than expected, putting additional pres-
sure on the available budget (Nyikuri et al. 2015). Further timely
decentralization of funds to the health facility level, providing the
scope to address community health issues under the guidance of com-
munity health committees could provide the autonomy for the
community-based primary health care team, mediated through the
CHWs, to address the needs of their catchment community, if the
needed capacity and accountability mechanisms are in place.
Limitations
Kenya’s 47 counties are extremely diverse which may limit the gen-
eralizability of findings. The selection of 10 study counties tried to
ensure diversity in demographic, geographic, social, cultural and
economic differences. Interviews were conducted with county
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leaders across 10 counties, but with health workers in three and com-
munity members in two counties due to time and resource con-
straints, and so findings are not necessarily generalizable across the
country. The restructuring and implications for power within
priority-setting and at community level will adapt over time. As such,
we can only ever present a snapshot of this in a particular time and
place. Positionality of the main interviewer as a foreign researcher
may have inhibited some respondents from openly sharing their opin-
ions. Conversely, some respondents may have felt less threatened and
discussed more. Inclusion of experienced Kenyan co-authors in study
design and analysis sought to bring ‘insider’ perspectives to the study.
Finally, while our study provides perceptions of equity following
devolution, it does not present health equity metrics.
Conclusions
In response to our main research questions, our study revealed a
general perception of improving equity between counties, while the
potential for deepening inequities within counties has not yet been
adequately addressed, since any rapid transition in power carries
with it a certain degree of risk that local elites may capture priority-
setting processes (Langran 2011). Avenues to understand and in-
corporate equity issues within priority-setting, such as public partici-
pation meetings have been established, but are often under-utilized,
with limited opportunity for active participation of members of mar-
ginalised groups. As a result, health priorities at times favour polit-
ical aspirations of leaders, leading to uneven interest and investment
in extending community health services for all. Through our obser-
vations of sub-national level priority-setting for community health,
in the period immediately following devolution we highlight exam-
ples of good and inspiring practice (see Box 2), a critique of the
main accountability challenges experienced, and recommendations
for improved community health services (Supplementary material).
Devolution in Kenya is still young—less than four years old. As
Kenya moves beyond the years immediately following these reforms,
it is important that the challenges revealed by this study are
addressed and positive institutional structures, processes and norms
are laid down which promote health equity for all Kenyans. Many
of the challenges experienced in Kenya have previously been seen
elsewhere. Our findings therefore provide lessons for other countries
considering or undergoing devolution reforms.
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Note
1. Devolved functions and authority occurred for ‘agriculture,
health services, air quality and pollution, cultural activities,
transport and infra- structure, animal control, trade develop-
ment and regulation, planning and development, several educa-
tional institutions, the implementation of national policies on
natural resources and conservation, public works and services,
disaster management and local governance’ (Steeves 2015, p.
461).
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